Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Talks. With me is an old and dear friend, General BK Sharma. General BK Sharma is the Director of the United Service Institution, the oldest defense think tank in India. He is a soldier and a scholar who has extraordinarily rich experience in field commands, in diplomacy and in the world of letters taught in original scholarship. It’s really an honor to have you, General. Thank you for your time.

General BK Sharma: Thank you, Atul-ji. As always, good to be with you, and my greetings to your viewers.

Atul Singh: Thank you, sir. Now, today we’ll be discussing something extremely important. What does this latest conflict mean? What is The New Strategic Landscape in India–Pakistan Relations? And today, we have a top man from India, a man who is in New Delhi, to explain to us what this all means.

So, General Sharma, explain to us what happened in the Islamist terrorist attack in Pahalgam. And for those of you listening, Pahalgam is a tourist site in Kashmir, and Kashmir is a part of Jammu and Kashmir. And General Sharma actually comes from that part of the world and has a lot of experience in that part of the world, and so he’ll explain to us: A) what happened in the Islamist terrorist attack in Pahalgam, and B) why India blamed Pakistan for this attack. Over to you, sir.

General BK Sharma: Thank you very much, Atul-ji. At the outset, it was a heinous act of terrorism. At Pahalgam, it happened on April 22. It was actually a targeted killing against the Hindu community, in which 26 innocent male members were killed in front of ladies and children after asserting their religious identity. Now, why did this killing—

Atul Singh: One of them was Christian, just so that our viewers know.

General BK Sharma: Yeah, yeah. But...

Atul Singh: It wasn’t just Hindus. One of them was a Christian, and he said he wasn’t a Hindu and still he was killed.

General BK Sharma: So for them, anybody who’s not an adherent of their religion is actually a kafir, or non-believer. So why did this act of terrorism take place at that juncture? We have to go a little bit into post-abrogation of Article 370, which had accorded a special status to the state of Jammu and Kashmir. And post—

Atul Singh: For our viewers, they must remember that this happened in 2019, if I remember correctly.

General BK Sharma: August 5, 2019. And post-that, there was a total, I would say, normalcy in Kashmir. Though there was a little bit of resentment and alienation, there was no loss of human life. And slowly, the Kashmir Valley started limping to normalcy. And last year, there was a major election in the state in which the voter turnout was 64% — unprecedented. And past that, there was a lot of tourist movement to that area. Nearly 3.5 million tourists visited last year, and it also gave a boost to the local economy, and there was overall peace and prosperity.

Now, this was an eyesore for Pakistan, and they could not see Jammu and Kashmir coming back to normalcy. And that is how this act of terrorism was planned. One is to disrupt what is going on there, and second was to engineer clashes between the majority community and minority community. And this was the reason. And the confession of this heinous act was taken by the Resistance Front, which is an offshoot of Lashkar-e-Taiba, and that is how all fingers pointed towards Pakistan.

Lashkar-e-Taiba and Asim Munir’s role

Atul Singh: Very quickly, General, can you explain what Lashkar-e-Taiba is to many of our viewers worldwide? We, of course, in the Indian subcontinent — both in India and Pakistan and even places like Bangladesh and Nepal — are well aware of Lashkar-e-Taiba, but people elsewhere are not. So please give some color on that.

General BK Sharma: Lashkar means “army,” and Taiba means “pure” — it’s an army of God, which is a protégé of ISI, and they have been very active in cross-border terrorism.

Atul Singh: ISI is Inter-Services Intelligence. That’s...

General BK Sharma: Yes, that is the Pakistani intelligence agency. And they’ve also used the Lashkar-e-Taiba against Afghanistan and against India. And there’s a beautiful book which is written by Professor Christine Fair on Lashkar-e-Taiba. Your readers could get hold of that book and read.

Atul Singh: Yeah, Christine has written a good book. And Christine is here, I believe, in Georgetown.

General BK Sharma: Yeah. So then, from our past mapping and the present indicators, all fingers were pointing towards Pakistan. And therefore, it was time for India to take some punitive action against the perpetrators of this act of terrorism. And that is how Operation Sindhur was launched. Sindhur means “vermilion” in English. And that is the red dot that Hindu married ladies…

Atul Singh: That’s the vermilion in the parting of the hair that—

General BK Sharma: ...put on their head. And since most of these ladies — about 25 of them — were widowed, it was a very sentimental buzzword which was given to this operation and which echoed with the sentiment of the people. This was some kind of a revenge against the loss of their husbands and things like that.

Atul Singh: I see. So that explains two things. That explains why Pakistan potentially did it, and why it had the incentives to do it, and why India blamed Pakistan. Now, let’s talk about the role of the then-General and now Field Marshal, Sayed Asim Munir Ahmad Shah, who is the Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan. In reality, the man who really runs Pakistan. And he’s a man with troops in Jalandhar. He’s the son of a teacher who was also an imam and the winner of the Sword of Honour in the Officers Training School, Mangla. So, he seems to be quite an ideological character. He was also head of ISI, and seems to be, in some ways, a high-flying officer. So, what do you think is his role, and what does this mean for the future?

General BK Sharma: See, if you study the profile of General Asim Munir, now Field Marshal, he’s been a very orthodox person right from his beginning. For example, when he was in Saudi Arabia on a diplomatic assignment, he did hifz of the Quran, which means memorizing the Quran by heart. And vis-à-vis many other top military officers of the Pakistan Army, he is not Western educated. Mostly, he has done some courses of instruction in Malaysia, Japan, but he has never been on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. And right from the beginning, he has exhibited very orthodox and extremist tendencies and has been a hardliner vis-à-vis India, be it in his appointment as Director General of Military Intelligence or Director General of ISI.

In fact, when Pulwama had happened — that terrorist attack in 2019 when India had launched Operation Balakot — that time, he was DG ISI. He’s also been a political general. The rift that he had with Imran Khan, and he was the person responsible for putting him behind bars and virtually decimating Pakistan’s Tehreek-e-Insaf movement.

Atul Singh: That’s the movement overall led by Imran Khan, and it is the strongest political force in Pakistan today. But the elections have been manipulated by the military, and they have brought back members of the old political dynasties into power. And so Asim Munir, what General Sharma is saying, is a key architect of that new interference. In some ways, then, he reminds me of General Zia-ul-Haq, sir.

General BK Sharma: Yeah. So, what happened is that, since he had orchestrated the fall of Imran Khan, there was so much resentment against him. I am told by some of my friends that before this operation happened, the Pakistan military was very shy — even their personnel were very shy of going in uniform to public places, because there was very strong sentiment against them. Now, this guy made three important speeches invoking the Two-Nation Theory. One he made in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa area when he was addressing a loya jirga — that is the assembly of elders. When he talked about the Two-Nation Theory, which means that Hindus and Muslims are two different people, two different cultures, customs, traditions and aspirations, and therefore they cannot coexist. And this message of the Two-Nation Theory should be taken to the future generation.

He again repeated this speech on April 16 this year at Islamabad, while addressing Pakistani diaspora members. And thereafter, in a few days — just about ten days after that — the Pahalgam attack happened. And it was a copybook of what he had said: segregation of Hindus from other tourists there. And that is how that killing took place. Even after that killing on April 22, on April 26, he made another speech at Pakistan’s Military Academy at the time of passing out. Again, he reiterated the Two-Nation Theory and urged the passing-out Pakistani military candidates to fight or to wage jihad against infidels.

So, if you put everything together, and the way this act was committed by them, all fingers were pointing towards Pakistan. Though there are many people who say in a very gullible manner that India had no evidence and they should have only taken this action only after some evidence was shown to the world community. But well, did the United States of America show any evidence to anybody? For that matter, when they attacked the Indian Parliament in 2001, later on the Bombay terrorist attacks took place in 2008, and then there have been a series of attacks in which Pakistan’s complicity has been established beyond any doubt. That was the reason — based on the history of Pakistan and the acceptance by the Resistance Front — that India was left with but a Hobson’s choice to take some punitive action against Pakistan, because the very mother of this entire hatred and religious extremism or terrorism emanated from the very top man who’s de facto the emperor of Pakistan.

Escalation, airstrikes and ceasefire

Atul Singh: I see. So Asim Munir has a critical role to play. And my question then is, now he’s a Field Marshal after the conflict. So does this mean dim prospects for peace in the future?

General BK Sharma: Yes. At the moment, India has taken a very strident position, as you would have seen. Our Prime Minister has been absolutely resolute in saying that trade, water and talks cannot move hand in hand with terror. And he’s also said that India will call Pakistan’s nuclear bluff, and that the Pakistan military establishment and terrorists are in cohort with each other — they are chips off the same block. So, any act of terrorism in future will be taken as an act of war, and India will resort to three basic lines of response: one is prevention, second is preemption and third is punishment.

Atul Singh: We’ll dive into this later, but tell us about your views on the military escalation between the two sides, because that’s on everyone’s minds. And what are the major takeaways from what India called Operation Sindhur? You’ve just explained Operation Sindhur anyways, but still, I wanted to bring that term back up for emphasis, because this was an emotive term. This resonated with the public. This was meant to establish a precedent for the future. So, please explain.

General BK Sharma: In the past, India had used strategic patience against Pakistan in the wake of sensational terrorist strikes. But there was a major terrorist strike in Kashmir, in a place called Uri, in 2017, after which India decided to act in a more proactive and resolute manner, and we carried out about six trans-border raids against the terrorist infrastructure.

Another act of terrorism took place in 2019 when they killed about 46 personnel of Central Armed Police Forces, and India then launched an airstrike into Balakot against the terrorist camp. And then there was another — the next day, Pakistanis did something, and thereafter there was an intervention and things cooled off.

This time again, a heinous act of terrorism was abetted by Pakistan, and therefore the national sentiment was to go for more resolute, retributory action. And that is why, on the very first night — that is, the night of May 6 and 7 — the first phase of Operation Sindhur was launched by the Indian Air Force and Indian Army, targeting nine terrorist camps or terrorist facilities inside Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and two in Punjab.

The two most important of these were: one at Muzaffarabad, which is the headquarters of Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the second is in central Punjab of Pakistan — Bahawalpur — where Jamaat-ud-Dawa, and there is another terrorist organization that was headquartered there. Hafiz Saeed is the head of that organization.

And then you had Hizbul Mujahideen, which is a PoK-based organization. There were another seven camps which we had targeted. So, during this targeting, there were about 70 to a hundred terrorists who were eliminated, including about 12 members of the family of Hafiz Saeed and of Masood Azhar, who is head of Jaish-e-Mohammed, and his headquarters is located there.

Now, what is interesting here is that the funerals of these killed terrorists were state funerals, in which the top Pakistan military generals participated. Their dead bodies were wrapped in Pakistani national flags. What more evidence does the world require about Pakistan’s complicity in these terrorist attacks?

Anyway, on that night, India’s intention was not to target any civilian or military establishment. It was a pinpointed strike, and India made it very clear to Pakistan that we are not interested in any escalation. That night also, some air action had taken place — maybe I can talk about it a little later — in which, possibly, as the CDS — Chief of Defence Staff — had said during the Shangri-La Dialogue, that there were some tactical mistakes from the Indian side, and perhaps there would be some loss of aircraft that night. How many, we really don’t know.

The next day, there was a kind of retaliation by Pakistan, in which they launched about 500 drones, quadcopters and missiles against India. But these were thwarted by India’s air defense system, which is mostly indigenous. With part support from Russia, we had developed our own indigenous air defense system — totally automated with artificial intelligence and equipped with the S-400 air defense.

Atul Singh: Also, the Israeli Barak, right? That’s also there.

General BK Sharma: Barak and Akashteer, which are made by our own DRDO. So none of these Pakistani strikes were successful. There was hardly any damage caused by them. Thereafter, India again went for a major retaliation, and that was on the day of May 10, wherein we targeted 11 of their airfields.

Some airfields in the province of Sindh were as deep as 350 kilometers, using BrahMos, which is a cruise missile — a supersonic, hypersonic cruise missile. We used that and targeted 11 of these airfields, including an airfield called Noor Khan, which is right in the heart of Rawalpindi, very close to their Strategic Plans Division, which controls their nuclear assets. The Prime Minister’s house was just about eight kilometers away, and GHQ — General Headquarters Rawalpindi — was in close proximity.

Now, this was penetrating through the entire air defense system of Pakistan, which is based on HQ-9, a Chinese-supplied air defense network. And we also did electronic jamming of some of their facilities in Lahore and a couple of other places. And Pakistan had no answer to this. It was at that juncture that they panicked. Then there was a sort of a request from their DGMO around 3 o’clock in the afternoon to go for a ceasefire. And India agreed to that ceasefire. Maybe backdoor, there would have been some conversation with some American interlocutors, but the decision for India to accept the ceasefire was entirely its own and not due to any mediation or anything of that nature.

The reason for that was that we had already accomplished our mission in terms of precision targeting of terrorist camps, and then upping the ante in the escalation ladder by going against their strategic airfields. And that is how that ceasefire came into being and it holds.

Atul Singh: So, General Sharma, it’s very interesting you say that it was entirely an Indian decision — because from where I sit in Washington, DC, that’s certainly not the perception. The perception is that US President Donald Trump leaned on Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The perception is that Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Vice President JD Vance tag-teamed, and the Indians gave into pressure. So it’s very interesting to hear a perspective on Delhi which is very different from Washington. In a few years, historians will indubitably thrash out the truth of the matter. But let us move on and talk about the Pakistan–China strategic nexus, which you’ve often spoken about in the past.

General BK Sharma: Please permit me to respond to what you said. Suppose, when India was on the ascendant side, what was the compulsion for India to accept some mediation from any side? You tell me. And what was the reason for President Trump, even before the Indian side had announced it, to just do that message on Twitter or X and announce it? And what has happened subsequently? Indian political leadership had pointedly declined that anything of this nature occurred. They have agreed that, yes, there was some conversation between the top leadership of the US and ours, but the decision to accept the ceasefire was not at the behest of A, B or C — it was entirely an Indian decision. So therefore, I don’t understand why should India be shying away from accepting if there was any pressure from any side?

Atul Singh: Well, I’m talking about public perception, correct? So the truth of the matter may be something that will come out, as I said, when historians write it. I’m talking about public perception — not just here in Washington but in London. And the government can say all it wants, but the perception is that Donald Trump exerted pressure, and his administration exerted pressure because Pakistan was probably imploding, or probably about to threaten nuclear strikes. God knows what they did on their side, but that is the public perception, and that is where on the narrative front — there’s always a narrative war that goes on during any war. And I’m sure different parties around the world are peddling their own narratives for their own interests.

General BK Sharma: Well, let me tell you. I mean, even though we may say that nuclear weapons are very dangerous, and the rest of the world thinks that, well, South Asia is the nuclear flashpoint, I think the nuclear threats are far more close in Europe today than they are in South Asia. So, at least in the Indian military, we have a very responsible no-first-use doctrine. If any sobering effect is to be had, it is to be on Pakistan, which, like a child, flashes its nuclear weapon. And there is a very serious debate that, if any side is to be dispossessed of nuclear weapons, it is an irresponsible state like Pakistan, which every time plays the nuclear card and nuclear rhetoric.

Atul Singh: And that is the public perception — that Pakistan played that card yet again, and therefore took advantage of nuclear blackmail. And that is the public perception here.

The Pakistan–China nexus

Atul Singh: Anyway, moving on to something you’ve talked about over the years and something you have a fair degree of expertise on, because you go to China — in fact, you go to Russia as well, and you speak Russian — and so you are best placed to talk about the Pakistan–China strategic nexus during this conflict and its future complexion.

General BK Sharma: See, firstly, what has happened at this time — there is full Chinese complicity in what Pakistan has done. Right from the beginning, when Pahalgam happened, Chinese media was parroting the Pakistani narrative, making statements like “Pakistan is playing a very important role in combating terrorism.” And at the UN Security Council, when that resolution was being drafted, they again asserted themselves, as in the past — as they have done in the case of UN Resolution 1267. They again asserted, and they moderated or toned down the tone and tenor of that resolution.

Later on, whatever weapon systems Pakistanis have used are Chinese-supplied. Eighty-one percent of Pakistani weapons come from China. And they are giving them BeiDou satellite imagery. Their entire aerospace domain awareness actually is coming from China. They also gave them the JF-10C, which is a state-of-the-art aircraft. Besides, they are doing co-production of the JF-17 aircraft.

And it is assumed that on the night of May 6 to May 7, Pakistanis did enjoy a little edge in the aerospace domination and control due to the Chinese making available the satellite imagery and PL-15E missiles, which are supposed to be BVR missiles, which are beyond the visual range—

Atul Singh: Exactly, I wanted you to explain that.

General BK Sharma: —beyond the visual range missile, which could fire from a long stand-off distance. And probably, if those missiles were used, that could have probably led to certain losses on our side.

Now, subsequently, what the Chinese are saying is that “we — Pakistan and China — are like iron brothers,” and “we will give them all the future aid that is possible.” And there is talk of providing them Yaogan remote satellite systems, then new-generation KJ-500 AEW&C — that is, Airborne Early Warning and Control systems. Since HQ-9, this time, has not done well, there are reports of the Chinese supplying them with HQ-19 air and missile defense systems, guided multi-barrel rocket launchers. And there even is talk about microwave weapons, anti-ship ballistic missiles, Hangor-class submarines — which have a better stealth signature — and Type 054 frigates, which again have a better signature.

The reason for this is that it fits into the overall strategy of China to fix India in the South Asian orbit, so that space is available to Beijing to maneuver around in the maritime space. Also, this conflict has proved that Pakistan is the laboratory of Chinese weapons systems. And by just spreading this narrative that Chinese weapons have done reasonably, fairly well, they can also improve the prospects of selling these weapons to some of the East Asian, South Asian and other countries.

So, as we see here, the China–Pakistan nexus is strong, and it is bound to grow. And therefore, for any future conflict, India should not lift its eyes from the Line of Actual Control — that is, our northern borders vis-à-vis China — because there is a possibility of a scenario when the Chinese could do forward and aggressive military positioning there to relieve the pressure on the Pakistani front. So, these are the forces and complexions of the Pakistan–China strategic nexus at the political, diplomatic and military level.

Atul Singh: So, you mentioned the forward and aggressive movement of Chinese troops. So let me push you a little bit: Do you envisage a two-front war?

General BK Sharma: See, it’s not a question of envisaging. The question is: do they have the capability? The capabilities definitely are there. And what the Chinese did in 2020 — they tried to make a pitch for the 1959 claim line by throwing to the wind all the accords that they had signed with India since 1993.

So, any wise nation — any nation that is worth its self-respect — cannot totally wish away or close its eyes to an impending threat. So, going by China’s intent, its capabilities and its strategic behavior, this threat very much remains plausible, and India will have to prepare for it.

India’s new security doctrine

Atul Singh: Understood. So what you’re saying is that the possibility remains and preparation,  therefore, is essential. Now, moving on to India’s new security doctrine — and everyone is saying there is a new security doctrine — what exactly is it, and what are its implications?

General BK Sharma: See, the new security doctrine that we’ve been talking about here is what we call the dynamic escalatory retaliation doctrine in multi-domain operations. And the strategic guidance for this comes from a political leader’s belief that there should be zero tolerance toward terrorism. We look at the entire ecosystem of terrorism: its sponsors and the foot soldiers put together. All acts of terrorism will be taken as acts of war, and we will also call Pakistan’s nuclear bluff — our Prime Minister is on record. And therefore, I don’t think any talks with Pakistan are in the near future or in the offing.

We are again, in a very firm manner, talking about the three P’s. And that is: prevention, preemption and punishment. And in terms of dynamic—

Atul Singh: The three P’s — describe them a little bit more. What exactly do you mean? What is the difference between prevention and preemption?

General BK Sharma: Prevention is that we have to button up our own internal security safeguards in terms of enhancing intelligence, in terms of anticipatory terrorist strikes and neutralization of some of the sleeper cells — and go for search and destroy missions to dismantle the entire ecosystem of terrorists, including their financing. So that is what we call prevention.

Preemption is that we will not now wait for anything. The moment we get any indication, any inkling that a terrorist attack is in the offing, or that Pakistanis are again building up their capacities along the Line of Control to launch terrorist strikes — we will take preemptive action.

And should Pakistan’s complicity be fully established, then we will go for retributive actions or punitive actions — punitive deterrence capability — against Pakistan. And all this now is going to be in the multi-domain operations, where we are going to combine non-kinetic and kinetic means.

For example, this time the whole punitive action started with the holding in abeyance of the Indus Waters Treaty. There are five rivers which flow from India into Pakistan.

Atul Singh: Let me stop you very quickly. Just explain to our viewers the difference between kinetic and non-kinetic, because military men understand it, but laymen don’t.

General BK Sharma: Yeah. So, non-kinetic means are non-military means. That means you’re not using your missiles or any explosive or any hard military platforms. So that entails, like, water as a tool of strategic coercion. Second is your use of cyber weapons. Psychological operations in the cognitive domain. So these are some of the non-kinetic means.

Whereas kinetic means are what we have been seeing day in and day out. So, in these multi-domain operations, we want to achieve a certain degree of supremacy in terms of sensor–shooter interface — sensors right from space down to the man with a binocular; shooter is from a pistol or a bayonet right up to maybe a space weapon.

And then we would like to look at flawless, seamless logistic supply chains, use of simulators for training in near-virtual or augmented reality environments. And the heart of this is EW — electronic warfare — cyber warfare, and then AI-driven command, control, communication, intelligence and surveillance systems.

So, we are heading in that direction. And at the moment, our effort is to produce indigenous systems so that we do not rely on any outside agency. And again, due to some disruption, then we won’t have to look over our shoulders. So this is what India’s dynamic escalatory retaliatory doctrine is, which is based on multi-domain operations and the technologies that disruptive warfare entails.

Indus Waters Treaty and strategic water disruption

Atul Singh: Now, let me ask you about the Indus Waters Treaty. This is the 1960 treaty that survived the 1971 war, that survived the 1998 Kargil conflict, that survived all the terrorist attacks — 2001, 2008 — and continued till 2025. It’s been suspended. Does that mean there will be water wars now?

General BK Sharma: Well, there won’t be any water wars, per se. But when we signed this Indus Waters Treaty — that means there are these five, six rivers. Three are the northern rivers, which is Indus; Jhelum, which flows through Kashmir and Chenab, which again flows from the southern part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir — or you can call it Union Territory.

Now, India uses 20% of those waters, and 80% flows into Pakistan. And three southern rivers in the plains, which are Ravi, Sutlej and Beas — India has 100% control over those waters.

So what we have done: When we signed this treaty, it was with a responsible state. The spirit was that this water would help them in their agriculture, and they would attain prosperity and stabilize and become a responsible state. But what we are witnessing today, we are dealing with a rogue and terrorist state.

So therefore, India, as an upper riparian state, reserves the right of putting this treaty into abeyance until Pakistan stops cross-border terrorism. This is our condition: You behave like a normal, civilized state which respects international treaty obligations, and then we can talk about the water.

We may have the capacity to alter the flow of these rivers and disrupt the cropping pattern in Pakistan, and thus use it as a tool of strategic coercion, with the hope that Pakistan stops cross-border terrorism. And then we can renegotiate the treaty all over again.

Atul Singh: Pakistan has said that will be a casus belli, and it would be a threat to the livelihood of hundreds of millions. Pakistan is largely an agrarian state, and they will have rivers of blood flowing should India try anything with the Indus Waters, including its tributaries’ waters.

General BK Sharma: Yeah. Well then, why is Shehbaz Sharif talking about initiating talks with India, including on water, terrorism and—

Atul Singh: Just so that our viewers know, Shehbaz Sharif is the Prime Minister of Pakistan. He is the brother of Nawaz Sharif, who was Prime Minister earlier. He comes from the Sharif political family. Over to you, sir.

General BK Sharma: So why is he talking about resuming these talks? Some hate is actually being felt there, right? And it is the people of Pakistan who will hold their government and their military accountable. That is exactly what was happening. Why is Pakistan’s economy today in doldrums? They’re going with the begging bowl to the IMF, Chinese, UAE, Saudi Arabia.

What has happened? India has not harmed their economy. So, a little push will come to shove.

Atul Singh: Very quickly, for historical context, our viewers should know that when India and Pakistan became independent, Pakistan actually had better irrigated land. Pakistan was better poised for economic growth. Pakistan was also a Cold War ally of the US, and Pakistan indeed had a certain degree of industrialization in the late ‘50s and 1960s.

However, in 2025, there is absolutely no comparison between the Indian economy and the Pakistani economy. Pakistan has gone to approximately 20+ times, apparently, to the IMF. I may be a bit wrong there — but Pakistan is broke. Pakistan’s military sucks resources out of the state, and the corruption in Pakistan has reached such astronomical levels that the moment money flows into Pakistan from abroad, property prices rise in Dubai.

So clearly that money is being siphoned off by elites. The elites have failed to provide drinking water, schooling, health and so on and so forth to the masses, and that is why Imran Khan held such an appeal for the masses — because he talked about this endemic corruption of the elites, and indeed, the disproportionate share of the economy that is monopolized by the military. Over to you, sir.

General BK Sharma: So, as I said, look — we will use water as a tool to moderate the behavior of Pakistan in a responsible manner. We are a responsible state. We respect international law. We will use it. And we can renegotiate the treaty the moment they give us these guarantees that they will not abet cross-border terror.

Atul Singh: But the question is — you say responsibility, and this is where I’m being asked by a number of my European and American friends — if you’re going to disrupt water flows, that will lead to famine in Pakistan. So is this the equivalent of a nuclear strike?

General BK Sharma: I’m sure good sense will prevail in Pakistan much before that, and such things will not come to pass. Sometimes you have to give a bitter pill to cure a sick mind.

India’s defense needs

Atul Singh: Okay. So we’ve talked about India’s new security doctrine. We’ve talked about its implications. You’ve talked about water as a non-kinetic tool of India’s new doctrine. This is my final question — what should India do to enhance its defense preparedness?

General BK Sharma: India has contested borders, both with Pakistan and China — and both of them are acting in tandem. Their political interests and their military interests totally coalesce vis-à-vis India. They are both autocratic, hegemonic states. India is the only democratic state, and therefore we have to be totally prepared for comprehensive national security to defend our sovereignty and our way of life.

So, in light of these series of events that have taken place vis-à-vis the Chinese and Pakistanis, it is high time that India should have a deep dive into its national security matrix. We definitely need a national security strategy.

Atul Singh: Do we not have one?

General BK Sharma: We do not have one that is articulated, and maybe we will not put one in the public domain, but we need to have one such document which is in sync with the geopolitical realities and the strategic security challenges which are staring us in the eyes.

Likewise, we need a national defense strategy — maybe a national military strategy — and a nuclear posture review in the light of whatever nuclear saber-rattling Pakistan does. India is just spending about 1.5% of the GDP on its defense.

Atul Singh: That is like a European country, almost like a European welfare state.

General BK Sharma: Yeah. So, given the threat perception, we need to increase our defense budget to maybe 2–2.5% of the GDP. Our procurement processes still move very slowly due to—

Atul Singh: At a glacial pace, as someone put it.

General BK Sharma: Yeah, red tapism and bureaucratic hurdles. We need to review and probably digitize that. Then we realize that, well, when the balloon goes up and the chips are down, you are all alone in the ring. So, we have to be self-sufficient in our defense technology. And that is why Atmanirbharta — what we call Make in India — must get a boost.

We still have to take long strides in terms of jointness, integration and theaterisation vis-à-vis the Chinese, who have theaterised commands. So we are in the process of creating theater commands. This must get accelerated.

Then, there still exist certain critical voids, particularly in the aerospace domain. Today, the strength of Indian Air Force squadrons comes to 31 squadrons, and are 4.5th-generation. Fifth-generation aircraft still are not in the offing in the near future, so we have to—

Atul Singh: Just to stop you there — so India has 31 functioning squadrons, and the sanction strength is 42, isn’t it?

General BK Sharma: Yeah, 42. So we have to boost up that strength and have our own aircraft like Tejas Mark 1 and Tejas Mark 2, for which we need engines — F404 or F414 engines — from the United States of America.

Then there is another AMCA series of aircraft that we want to indigenize, or do domestic production of that. That will take another ten years. So these must get speeded up.

A lot of investments have to be made in artificial intelligence, machine learning, big data analytics, supercomputing — because lethal autonomous weapon systems or quasi-autonomous weapon systems are going to be the weapons of the future. So investment in that.

Then, our strategic communication still is not up to the mark. We have seen it — that many a time, though India is morally on a high ground, our strategic narrative or communication is quite disparate and diffuse. So a lot of effort has to go into that.

We’ve seen all the wars in Ukraine and elsewhere — that today, it is not only the militaries, but the entire nation that fights together. So, we want to adopt a whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach, in which not only the government agencies and military, but your academia, your research institutions, your industry partners — all act in tandem and toward a common purpose. So this needs to be institutionalized.

And last, I think we can say that we are living in a new era — an era that is characterized by VUCA.

Atul Singh: VUCA! That’s volatility, uncertainty, complexity…

General BK Sharma: Volatility, uncertainty, complexity, ambiguity. And I will add two more to that: hyper-connectivity, as you’ve seen through social media, and disruption.

So we have to gear up for that. And we cannot cope with this kind of strategic environment by having linear thinking or working in silos. So we need to develop skills in critical thinking, remove the cognitive biases, address the blind spots, overcome mental maps and groupthink. So we need a new crop of multi-domain experts who can put their minds together and find some very innovative solutions to these very complex national security issues.

These are some of the areas which are in the pipeline. And I think there is a sense of urgency in India today, that everything should not be taken, like what happens in most democracies, on a very slow basis. But there is a need to give an impetus to this.

And finally, I would just close my remarks by saying that there is a realization here. We all keep saying that India needs to heed three mantras. One is what Thucydides said: “The strong do what they can. The weak suffer what they must.”

Atul Singh: That’s the Melian Dialogue, Thucydides. The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer as they must.

General BK Sharma: And then what Paulo Coelho, my favorite author, said: “Love thy neighbor, but never sell your sword.”

And then I’ll allude to President Roosevelt. He said: “Speak softly, but carry a long stick. You will go far.”

Atul Singh: You’re talking about Teddy Roosevelt here! (Laughs)

General BK Sharma: Yeah. So these are the three mantras I think we should heed here in India. Be a responsible, pluralistic, democratic state, but at the same time, have strong deterrence and warfighting capabilities.

Atul Singh: Excellent. On that note, thank you very much for your time. Those of you who are watching this, make sure you subscribe to our YouTube channel. Make sure you share this video, and we’ll have General BK Sharma back in a jiffy. All the best, thank you.

General BK Sharma: Thank you.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

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